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INTRODUCTION
The number of unlawful weapons defendants appearing in federal
1
court almost doubled between 2000 and 2005. In addition, federal
judges currently impose harsher sentences on felon in possession
2
defendants. This is a direct result of an increased involvement by
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. in Economics, cum
laude, Colgate University, 2009. The author developed his interest in the law from his
parents, and would therefore like to dedicate this note to them, John McDonald, Esq. and the
Honorable Bernadette N. DeCastro, J.S.C.
1
In 2000, the United States government filed weapons charges against 2810 individuals
under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), whereas in 2005 that number had grown to 5513. See infra
Appendix I “Number of defendants in cases filed.” See also Federal Criminal Case
Processing Statistics, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/fjsrc/ (under
“U.S. Criminal Code: Choose a Statistic” select “Number of defendants in cases filed”; then
select year and choose “Select by chapter and section within U.S.C. Title 18”; select chapter
“44-Firearms”; then select “18 922 G”; finally, select desired output format) (last visited
Oct. 23, 2010).
2
The mean prison term trended upwards between 2000 and 2008. The frequency of
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federal law enforcement into areas of criminal law that were
traditionally believed to be reserved for the states. This Note will
analyze the relationship between the federal sentencing guidelines and
the felon in possession statute, which forbids a convicted felon from
3
possessing a firearm.
The felon in possession law provides a particularly unique vehicle
for federal prosecutions because the required felony may have been
from a state court. Additionally, federal prosecutions often originate at
the state level and are referred by local law enforcement for federal
prosecution to capitalize on the harshness of federal sentencing
guidelines. Given the nature of these prosecutions, many of which
would likely have been pursued by local law enforcement, courts should
be allowed, if not required, to consider the disparity between federal
defendants and similarly situated state defendants.
This Note will begin in Section I with a brief discussion of the
background of the felon in possession law contained in 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1), including its purpose for enactment and its elements. Section
II will provide background information on the United States Sentencing
Guidelines and examine particular sentencing considerations for felons
in possession of firearms. Section III will discuss the increasing
federalization of local crime through the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. Section IV will discuss the particular methods employed
by the United States government in ferreting out gun possession by
prohibited persons. Finally, Section V will examine the reasons for
allowing federal courts to consider state sentences despite the
guidelines’ concern for eliminating federal sentencing disparities.

defendants sentenced to life also increased during this time period, particularly since 2004.
See infra charts titled “Defendants sentenced to life” and “Mean prison sentence in months.”
See also Federal Criminal Case Processing Statistics, supra note 1 (under “U.S. Criminal
Code: Choose a Statistic” select “Mean prison or probation sentence, or fine amount, for
defendants convicted”; then select year and choose “Select by chapter and section within
U.S.C. Title 18”; select chapter “44-Firearms”; then select “18 922 G”; finally, select
desired output format).
3
18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2005) (“It shall be unlawful for any person (1) who has been
convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting
commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has
been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”).
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I. BACKGROUND OF THE FELON IN POSSESSION LAW
Writing about his undercover investigation into the Hell’s Angels
motorcycle gang, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
(hereinafter “ATF”) agent Jay Dobyns referred to the felon in
4
possession statute as “ATF’s ‘bread-and-butter’ violation.” Agent
Dobyns used this description to tell the other agents of his intention to
“bust” a recently released man who “was rumored to be in possession of
5
6
a used .38 Rossi.” While this is a widely accepted use of the statute, it
does not appear to be a use contemplated by the purported purpose of
the enactment, which instead suggests the Act targets actual transactions
7
in firearms and not solely their possession.
8
The felon in possession statute was part of a criminal justice
system overhaul encapsulated by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
9
Streets Act of 1968, which added “Chapter 44 - FIREARMS.” While
10
there were early firearm regulations in place, this was the first time
possession of a weapon by a formerly convicted felon constituted a
crime. The original statute stated:
[a]ny person who (1) has been convicted by a court of the United
States or of a State or any political subdivision thereof of a
felony, . . . and who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce
or affecting commerce, after the date of enactment of this Act, any
firearm shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not
11
more than two years, or both.

The statute contained exemptions for licensed law enforcement

4

JAY DOBYNS & NILS JOHNSON-SHELTON, NO ANGEL: MY HARROWING UNDERCOVER
JOURNEY TO THE INNER CIRCLE OF THE HELLS ANGELS 10 (2010).
5
Id.
6
See, e.g., EDMUND F. MCGARRELL ET AL., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROJECT SAFE
NEIGHBORHOODS-A NATIONAL PROGRAM TO REDUCE GUN CRIME: FINAL PROJECT REPORT
178 (Apr. 2009), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/226686.pdf.
7
See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 901,
82 Stat. 197, 225 (1968). Contra § 1201, 82 Stat. at 225 (finding and declaring weapon
possession by prohibited persons a problem, but limiting incarceration to no longer than two
years).
8
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
9
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 § 902, 82 Stat. at 226.
10
See, e.g., National Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 73-474, § 6, 48 Stat. 1236, 1238 (1968)
(making it unlawful to receive or possess an unregistered or untaxed firearm).
11
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 § 1202, 82 Stat. at 236.
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officers and those who have been pardoned by the President. The
reasons Congress provided for the prohibition of certain persons from
carrying weapons were: (1) to alleviate the burden they placed on
interstate commerce; (2) to eliminate the threat they posed to the
President; (3) to eliminate any threat they posed to the first amendment;
and (4) to eliminate any threat they posed to the government of the
14
United States and the government of each state. This section, dealing
with prohibiting possession of firearms by certain individuals, was
distinct from other sections dealing with illegal trade in firearms, which
15
at the time solely composed 18 U.S.C. § 922. At its original enactment,
18 U.S.C. § 922(g) prohibited the interstate transportation of stolen
16
firearms and ammunition.
17
In Huddleston v. United States, the Court noted that Congress
passed this legislation in order to “curb crime by keeping ‘firearms out
of the hands of those not legally entitled to possess them because of age,
criminal background, or incompetency . . .’” and to channel commerce
in firearms “through federally licensed importers, manufacturers, and
dealers in an attempt to halt mail-order and interstate consumer traffic in
18
these weapons.” This particular case, however, dealt not with the usual
instance of a felon in possession of a firearm, but instead with a former
felon who made false statements regarding his prior felony in order to
recover his former weapon from a pawnshop in violation of another
prohibition of 18 U.S.C. § 922.
Subsequently, the Gun Control Act of 1968 amended the Omnibus
19
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. The felon in possession
20
statute remained codified in Section 1202. The only real change with
respect to felon in possession law was the qualification of the term
felon, which previously included “any offense punishable by
12

§ 1203(1), 82 Stat. at 237.
§ 1203(2), 82 Stat. at 237.
14
§ 1201, 82 Stat. at 236.
15
Compare Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, § 902, 82 Stat. at 226
(prohibiting illegal trade in firearms), with § 1202, 82 Stat. at 236 (prohibiting possession of
firearms by prohibited persons).
16
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 § 922(g), 82 Stat. at 231.
17
Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814 (1974).
18
Id. at 824.
19
Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 301(a), 82 Stat. 1213, 1237 (1968).
20
§ 301, 82 Stat. at 1236.
13
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21

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” to exclude “any offense
(other than one involving a firearm or explosive) classified as a
misdemeanor under the laws of a State and punishable by a term of
22
imprisonment of two years or less.”
In 1986, Congress again amended the felon in possession statute
23
through the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act. Unlike its predecessors,
this Act purported to represent an amelioration of the perceived
24
harshness of federal firearm regulation. This amendment made major
changes to the structure of the felon in possession law. First, it removed
those who are under indictment for felonies from the purview of the
25
statute. Second, it eliminated Section 1201, which contained the
26
original felon in possession statute. Finally, it replaced the prior
prohibitive language “to ship or transport any firearm or ammunition in
interstate or foreign commerce” with “to ship or transport in interstate
or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm
or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been
27
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” In addition
to the amendment to the substantive law, Congress also enacted a
fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence for those convicted under 18
U.S.C. § 922(g) who previously had been convicted of three or more
28
robberies, burglaries, or a combination of the two. Interestingly, the
two-year statutory maximum protection contained in the predecessor
felon in possession statute was not carried over to its new codification
29
in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). In essence, the law prohibiting possession of a
firearm by a felon moved from its own chapter to one concerned with
30
the actual trade, distribution, and movement of illegal weapons.
21

Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 § 1202(c)(2), 82 Stat. at 236.
Gun Control Act of 1968 § 301(b), 82 Stat. at 1236.
23
Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 102, 100 Stat. 449, 451 (1986).
24
§ 1(b), 100 Stat. at 449.
25
§ 102(6)(A), 100 Stat. at 452.
26
§ 104(b), 100 Stat. at 459.
27
§ 102(6)(D), 100 Stat. at 452.
28
§ 104(a)(4), 100 Stat. at 458.
29
Compare Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,
§ 1202, 82 Stat. 197, 236 (1968), with Firearms Owner Protection Act § 104(a)(1), 100 Stat.
at 456 (providing a five year statutory maximum subject to other limitations).
30
See United States v. Palozie, 166 F.3d 502, 505 (2d Cir. 1999) (“The legislative
history of the Firearm Owners’ Protection Act confirms what the drafting shows: the intent
of Congress was to combine into one section Titles IV and VII of the Omnibus Crime
22
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Today, the government need only prove three elements to convict a
person under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). First, federal prosecutors must
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a court had previously convicted
31
the criminal defendant of a crime punishable by a term exceeding one
32
year. Whether or not the defendant actually received a sentence
33
exceeding one year is irrelevant for the purposes of this statute. The
only inquiry is whether the prior conviction could have included a term
of imprisonment exceeding one year, i.e., whether the statutory
34
maximum was in excess of one year. Even an imposed sentence of
probation cannot save the defendant from coming under the scope of the
35
statute. The defendant may not challenge the validity of the conviction
at the time of trial because “federal gun laws . . . focus not on reliability,
but on the mere fact of conviction . . . in order to keep firearms away
36
from potentially dangerous persons.” The challenge must be made
37
before the acquisition of a firearm. Additionally, the Supreme Court
previously held that even an expunged matter might serve as the
38
predicate conviction. However, Congress superseded this type of
39
expansion three years later.
The second element that the government must prove is that the
Control and Safe Streets Act.”).
31
The language “any court” refers to any domestic court. There previously existed a
split among the circuits as to whether the term “any court” included courts outside the
territorial control of the United States. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and resolved
the question in the negative. See Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 394 (2005).
32
United States v. Daniel, 134 F.3d 1259, 1263 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 830
(1998).
33
Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., 460 U.S. 103, 113 (1983) (“It was plainly irrelevant
to Congress whether the individual in question actually receives a prison term; the statute
imposes disabilities on one convicted of ‘a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year.’” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2005)).
34
For a greater analysis of this point, see United States v. Currier, 821 F.2d 52, 58-59
(1st Cir. 1987).
35
See United States v. Williams, 442 F.3d 1259, 1261 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he fact that
Defendant’s term of imprisonment was reduced by probation does not convert his violation
of the statute into a misdemeanor.”).
36
Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 67 (1980).
37
Id.
38
Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 121 (“[A] rule that would give effect to expunctions under
varying state statutes would seriously hamper effective enforcement of Title IV.”).
39
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2005). See also United States v. Julian, 974 F. Supp. 809,
815 (M.D. Pa. 1997) (“Three years after and in response to Dickerson, Congress amended
Chapter 44 of Title 18.”).
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defendant possessed the firearm and ammunition alleged in the
40
indictment. As part of this element, the government must prove that the
defendant possessed the requisite mens rea of knowingly possessing the
41
firearm. The government may prove knowledge of possession by
42
showing either actual or constructive possession. Constructive
possession is “the power and intention at a given time to exercise
43
dominion and control over an object.” Either constructive or actual
44
possession can be proven by circumstantial evidence.
The final element is that the possession affects interstate
45
commerce. Interpreting this jurisdictional element, courts have used
an expansive definition of the Commerce Clause based on the Court’s
46
instruction in United States v. Lopez that eliminates any need to show
the individual defendant’s possession “substantially” affects interstate
47
commerce. All that is needed is “a one-time past connection to
48
interstate commerce . . . .” It appears that the government need only
prove that the firearm was manufactured in a state other than that in
49
which it was found.
II. THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES
This section will introduce the United States Sentencing
Guidelines and seek to show how they impact sentences for felons in
40

United States v. Daniel, 134 F.3d 1259, 1263 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 830
(1998).
41
Id.
42
United States v. Murphy, 107 F.3d 1199, 1207 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v.
Craven, 478 F.2d 1329, 1333 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973)).
43
Murphy, 107 F.3d at 1208 (quoting Craven, 478 F.2d at 1333).
44
Id.
45
Daniel, 134 F.3d at 1263.
46
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)
47
See, e.g., United States v. Quintana, No. 00 Cr. 842, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18192, at
*11 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2000) (“Accordingly, Lopez’s third prong—requiring that the
regulated activity ‘substantially affect’ interstate commerce—may be satisfied if there is a
jurisdictional element in place which would ensure that any given act of possession only
‘affects’ interstate commerce.”).
48
United States v. Beasley, 346 F.3d 930, 936 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v.
Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996, 1001 (9th Cir. 1988)).
49
See, e.g., United States v. Younger, 398 F.3d 1179, 1193 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The
evidence in this case was undisputed that defendant’s guns were manufactured in
Massachusetts and found in California. Consequently, the district court’s jury instruction
was proper and the evidence sufficient . . . .”).
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possession. The first subsection will provide general background on the
United States Sentencing Guidelines. This will include their creation,
their raison d’être, and their basic method for determining sentences.
The final subsection will examine the specific impact these guidelines
have on felon in possession law including an examination of sentence
enhancements that are germane to most felon in possession offenses.
A. General Background
In the mid-1980s, Congress formed the United States Sentencing
Commission (“the Commission”) in an effort to curb sentencing
50
disparities and uncertainty. This Commission developed numerous
guidelines and policies set out in the United States Sentencing
51
Guidelines Manual (“the Guidelines” or “the USSG”). The
Commission’s authority stemmed from the Sentencing Reform Act of
52
53
1984, part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. This act
delegated broad powers to the Commission in its charge to “review and
54
rationalize the federal sentencing process.” The Commission’s
55
authority today is rooted in 28 U.S.C. § 994(a). The basic purpose of
the guidelines was to further the four major principals of criminal
56
justice: deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation.
The Commission’s most important duty was to create offense
57
behavior categories and offender characteristic categories. The offense
behavior categories look at the particulars of the crime, such as whether
58
a weapon was used or how much money was taken. Categories of
offender characteristics are concerned with the individual being
sentenced, usually the number of past crimes the individual committed
59
and the seriousness of those crimes. The Commission then created
guideline ranges used to determine the “appropriate sentence for each
50
See Mark T. Dooer, Note, Not Guilty? Go to Jail. The Unconstitutionality of
Acquitted-Conduct Sentencing, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 235, 238 (2009).
51
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1-2 (2009).
52
Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 211, 98 Stat. 1987, 1987 (1984).
53
Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 201, 98 Stat. 1976, 1976 (1984).
54
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (2009).
55
Id. § 1A3.1.
56
Id. § 1A1.2.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
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class of convicted persons determined by coordinating the offense
60
behavior categories with the offender characteristic categories.”
Congress’s goals in having the Commission create the Guidelines were
threefold: (1) to achieve an honest and fair sentencing system without
the need for parole boards; (2) to achieve reasonable sentence
uniformity by making sure similar sentences were imposed upon
similarly situated criminals committing similar offenses; and (3) to
achieve proportionality in sentences based on the relative severity of the
61
offense. The Commission acknowledges tension between ensuring
62
uniformity and ensuring proportionality.
The Guidelines are based on the offenses charged by the
government, but they also look to elements of the defendant’s real
63
conduct during the crime for purposes of sentencing. For example,
under the Guidelines, two identical former felons committing identical
bank robberies with a firearm should be sentenced within the same
64
guideline range as one another. This result should remain constant
even if the government convicted one former felony under 18 U.S.C. §
922(g) felon in possession violation and the other under 18 U.S.C. §
2113(a) bank robbery violation, because the guidelines look not only to
the charge elements of the crime but also to the defendant’s real
65
conduct.
The Commission initially determined the Guideline ranges by
estimating “the average sentences served within each category under the
pre-guidelines sentencing system[,]” taking into account the relative
differences among those who served the sentences, and examining “the
sentences specified in federal statutes, in the parole guidelines, and in
66
other relevant, analogous sources.” There is evidence, however, that
the Commission may have simply acquiesced to certain views of
60

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (2009).
Id. § 1A1.3.
62
Id. See also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 349 (2007) (“The Guidelines
commentary explains how, despite considerable disagreement within the criminal justice
community, the Commission has gone about writing Guidelines that it intends to embody
these ends. It says, for example, that the goals of uniformity and proportionality often
conflict. The commentary describes the difficulties involved in developing a practical
sentencing system that sensibly reconciles the two ends.”).
63
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.4(a) (2009).
64
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 253 (2005).
65
See id.
66
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.4(g) (2009).
61

MCDONALD FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011

12/16/2011 12:31 PM

FELON IN POSSESSION SENTENCING

115

67

Congress in its determination of some of the guidelines.
Originally, the Guidelines required the district courts to sentence in
accordance with the Guidelines unless the individual defendant’s
68
situation required a departure from the guideline range. In the case of a
departure, the departing court had to specify atypical characteristics of
69
the defendant or some other reason for the departure. Regardless of
whether the district court followed or departed from the guideline range,
the United States Circuit Court for the circuit enveloping the district
court had, as it still does, the power to review the sentence imposed
70
below.
The Guidelines remained mandatory, with the exception of
71
72
departures, until 2005. In United States v. Booker, the United States
Supreme Court determined that the mandatory nature of the Guidelines
violated the Sixth Amendment in that as courts placed an increasing
emphasis on facts used solely for the purpose of sentence
enhancements, the role of the jury as fact-finder for the underlying
73
crime became diminished. In order to save the Guidelines, which the
Court implied would still have value in examining the defendant’s “real
74
conduct” to minimize sentencing disparities for similarly situated
75
76
defendants, the Court severed two sections of the statute. The first
67

See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 96 (2007) (“The Commission did not
use this empirical approach in developing the Guidelines sentences for drug-trafficking
offenses. Instead, it employed the 1986 Act’s weight-driven scheme.”). See also K. Anthony
Thomas, Memorandum in Support of John Doe’s Position on Sentencing, 4 (2008),
available at http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/2K2.1%20Sentmemo.pdf (“In the wake of Rita, Gall,
and Kimbrough, courts around the country are scrutinizing once-inscrutable guidelines,
finding that a perhaps—surprising number of them are not the result of empirical research
and national experience, and imposing sentences that accord with their evaluation of the §
3553(a) factors overall.”).
68
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (2009).
69
See id. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2010); 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2003).
70
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (2009).
71
§ 1A2.
72
543 U.S. 220 (2005).
73
See id. at 236-237. The Court subsequently stated that, “[t]he Sixth Amendment
question . . . is whether the law forbids a judge to increase a defendant’s sentence unless the
judge finds facts that the jury did not find (and the offender did not concede).” (emphasis in
original). Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 352 (2007) (citing Blakely v. Washington,
542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004)).
74
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 252 (2005).
75
Id. at 250-251.
76
Id. at 259.

MCDONALD FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

116

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

12/16/2011 12:31 PM

Vol. 36:1

section severed was 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), which had made
sentencing within the Guidelines mandatory. The other section severed
was 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), provided for de novo appellate review of
departures from the Guidelines. The effect of these severances relegated
77
78
the Guidelines to an advisory capacity. In United States v. Rita, the
Court subsequently addressed the standard of review for a sentence
imposed within the guideline range and adopted a rebuttable
79
presumption of reasonableness.
In the courtroom, the sentencing judge usually begins by
80
considering the presentence report and the interpretation it gives to the
81
guidelines. The judge may then hear arguments from the prosecution
or defense as to why the Guidelines sentence is inapplicable to the
82
particular defendant. Under USSG § 5K2.0, either side may argue for a
departure from the Guidelines’ range because the particular defendant
falls outside the scope to which the Commission meant the Guidelines
83
to apply. The sides may also argue that, based on Booker, the Court
should vary the sentence because it would either not reflect the goals of
sentencing contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) or be improper for some
84
other reason. The judge will then determine the sentence based on the
calculated guideline range, any grounds for departures, and the
85
sentencing objectives contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

77

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (2010) (“The Court reasoned
that an advisory guideline system, while lacking the mandatory features that Congress
enacted, retains other features that help to further congressional objectives, including
providing certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding
unwarranted sentencing disparities, and maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit
individualized sentences when warranted.” (referring to Booker, 543 U.S. at 264-65)). See
also Booker, 543 U.S. at 264 (“The district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines,
must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.” (citing 18 USC
§ 3553 (a)(4), (5) (Supp. 2004))).
78
551 U.S. 338 (2007).
79
Id. at 350-51.
80
For the procedure mandated by statute upon the probation officer preparing the
report, see 18 U.S.C. § 3552(a) (1990). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (providing the criminal
procedural rule for sentencing a criminal defendant in federal court and specifically
outlining what must be included in the presentence report).
81
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007).
82
Id.
83
See id.
84
See id.
85
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (2009).
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Section 3553(a) gives the factors that the sentencing court must
86
consider in its imposition of a sentence. The statute contains an initial
limiting clause, providing that the sentence be sufficient but not greater
than necessary to comply with the need for the sentence based on the
87
sub-factors of subsection two (“the need for the sentence imposed”).
The first factor to be considered is “the nature and circumstances of the
88
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.”
89
The next factor is the need for the sentence imposed. The need for
the sentence imposed ought to: (1) reflect the seriousness of the crime,
promote respect for the law and provide just punishment; (2) provide
adequate deterrence; (3) protect the public from any future crimes by
the defendant; and (4) give the defendant any needed vocational or
90
educational training. The court will then consider the kinds of
sentences available, the sentence established by the guidelines range,
pertinent policy statements, “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found
91
guilty of similar conduct[,]”and finally any need for restitution. While
this analysis appears to consider the guidelines as only one distinct part
of the sentencing process, some believe the overall process necessitates
imposing the same sentence that would have been reached under the
mandatory Guidelines, thus making the Guidelines more than
92
“advisory” if not making them effectively mandatory.
B. The Guidelines With Respect to Felon in Possession Law
With respect to felon in possession law, the defendant’s prior
93
convictions play a large part in driving up the guideline range. Some
86

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2010).
§ 3553(a).
88
§ 3553(a)(1).
89
§ 3553(a)(2).
90
§ 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D).
91
§ 3553(a)(3)-(7).
92
See Hon. Michael W. McConnell, U.S.C.J., The Booker Mess, 83 DENV. U. L. REV.
665, 682 (2006) (“In practical effect, the Guidelines continue to be the benchmark for
responsible judging, with variances only for unusual cases. Moreover, and more
speculatively, appellate review may coerce virtual Guidelines compliance in the ordinary
run of cases.”)
93
Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Sixth Annual American Judicature Society
Symposium Assessing the Values of Punishment: The State of Sentencing in the United
States Criminal Justice System: Symposium Article: Improving the Guidelines through
87
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prior convictions are treated more severely than others; “[s]pecifically,
prior convictions for crimes of violence or drug-trafficking offenses
94
result in an enhanced offense level.” Not only will previous crimes
quickly raise the guideline range, but the Commission has also
increased the rate at which those convictions will raise the guideline
95
range.
Due to concern that a large portion of the sentences for felony
possession of a firearm were at the high end of the guideline range, the
Sentencing Commission used one of its working groups to examine
96
possible amendments. The group concluded “that characteristics such
as actual or intended use of the weapon, drug-related conduct, or
possession of particularly deadly weapons accounted for such
97
sentences.” Despite the group finding “that there was no strong
correlation between the existence of the types of prior convictions listed
(firearm offenses, drug-related offenses, or convictions for crimes of
violence) and the length of sentence imposed,” the Commission still
raised the base offense level by twelve points for defendants previously
convicted of two felony convictions for either violent crimes or crimes
98
involving controlled dangerous substances.
The Commission revised the guidelines in response to Congress’s
99
enactment of the Armed Career Criminal Act. The Commission
reasoned that, in passing the Armed Career Criminal Act, Congress
Critical Evaluation: An Important New Role for District, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 575, 587 (2009)
(“For status offenses such as felon in possession of a firearm and unlawful reentry after
deportation, the guideline range is largely driven by the nature of the defendant’s prior
convictions.”).
94
Id.
95
Id. at 587-88
96
Thomas, supra note 67, at 10. See also Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 93.
97
Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 93, at 587. See also Thomas, supra note 67, at 1011.
98
Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 93, at 587-88. See also Thomas, supra note 67, at
10-11. See generally, Fifteen Years of Guidelines Sentencing, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 67
(2004),
available
at
http://www.ussc.gov/Research/Research_Projects/
Miscellaneous/15_Year_Study/15_year_study_full.pdf. (Perhaps most startling is the
treatment of gun traffickers compared to those whose only crime is possession of a firearm:
“For traffickers, the use of probation has been steadily reduced to about one-quarter of its
preguidelines level, replaced by imprisonment and, to a lesser extent, intermediate
sanctions. For illegal possessors, probation has been replaced almost completely by
imprisonment.”)
99
Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 93, at 588. See also Thomas, supra note 67, at 1011.
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“had determined that greater sentences were called for when the
100
defendant had prior convictions for drugs or violence.” This was done
101
despite the Commission’s own research to the contrary. Today, the
average prison sentence has doubled from what it was in the pre102
Guidelines era.
There are numerous provisions of the Guidelines that call for
additional sentence enhancements or even upward departures for the use
103
or possession of a gun. Section 5K2.6 of the Guidelines calls for an
increased sentence above the guideline range if the defendant used or
possessed a weapon or dangerous instrumentality during the
104
commission of the offense, presuming the sentencing judge finds the
guideline range does not adequately take into account the degree of
105
danger presented by the firearm. At least one court has held that this
departure could be used after the application of several sentencing
106
107
enhancements pursuant to Section 2K2.1 of the Guidelines.
Section 2K2.1 contains many enhancements that may apply to
felons in possession of firearms. First, this section provides for
calculation of the base offense level to be used in the guideline

11.

100

Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 93, at 588. See also Thomas, supra note 67, at 10-

101

See Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 93, at 587-88. See also Thomas, supra note 67,

at 11.

102

Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 93, at 588.
See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.6 (2009); U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1 (2009).
104
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.6 (2009) (“If a weapon or dangerous
instrumentality was used or possessed in the commission of the offense the court may
increase the sentence above the authorized guideline range. The extent of the increase
ordinarily should depend on the dangerousness of the weapon, the manner in which it was
used, and the extent to which its use endangered others. The discharge of a firearm might
warrant a substantial sentence increase.”).
105
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0(a)(2)-(3) (2009). The advisory note
provides an example of a robbery that results in an injury to another. While injury to another
is generally taken into account by the guidelines as part of a robbery with a specific
enhancement depending on the extent, an upward departure may be warranted if the robber
injured multiple people. Id.
106
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1 (2009).
107
United States v. Hardy, 99 F.3d 1242, 1248-50 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that an
upward departure for a felon in possession may be warranted based on the quantity of
firearms and the inherent danger of those particular types of firearms despite the application
of similar sentence enhancements under Section 2K2.1).
103
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108

calculation. For a felon in possession, the minimum base offense level
109
is fourteen and the maximum is twenty-six. If the offense involves a
110
weapon identified in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) or a semi-automatic firearm
111
with a large capacity magazine the base offense level is twenty.
Similarly, if the defendant’s former felony is for a crime of violence or
a controlled dangerous substance (i.e., drug) offense, the base offense
112
level is also twenty. If both of the aforementioned are true, that the
crime involved one of the specified weapons, and the defendant was
formerly found guilty of a violent or drug offense, the base level
113
becomes twenty-two. Two convictions for either violent or controlled
114
substance offenses leads to a base offense level of twenty-four, and
when combined with one of the specifically identified weapons,
115
increases the base offense level to twenty-six.
The next part of Section 2K2.1 deals with enhancements to the
116
base offense levels. If more than three weapons are possessed, the
117
base offense level will increase depending on the precise number. If
the defendant possessed a destructive device, the base offense level will
increase fifteen points for a rocket or missile, or two points for any
118
other kind of destructive device. A stolen firearm will increase the
119
base offense level by two points, and any destruction or alteration of
the serial number on the firearm will increase the base offense level by
120
four points. While Section 2K2.1 limits the increases to a maximum
121
122
offense level of twenty-nine under these particular enhancements,
108

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(a) (2009).
Id. § 2K2.1(a).
110
This essentially applies to modified (“sawed-off”) shotguns, modified rifles,
machineguns, and any firearm with a silencer. 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) (1986).
111
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) (2009).
112
Id. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A).
113
Id. § 2K2.1(a)(3).
114
Id. § 2K2.1(a)(2).
115
Id. § 2K2.1(a)(1).
116
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(b) (2009) (“Specific Offense
Characteristics”).
117
See Id. § 2K2.1(b)(1) (2009).
118
See Id. § 2K2.1(b)(3) (2009).
119
See Id. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) (2009).
120
See Id. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) (2009).
121
Unless the fifteen-point increase applies from Section 2K2.1(b)(3), in this case, the
offense level may rise above twenty-nine points. Id. § 2K2.1(b) (2009).
122
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(b) (2009) (“The cumulative offense
109
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other enhancements may apply to raise the offense level well-above
123
twenty-nine. Involvement in firearm trafficking raises the level by
124
125
four, as does possession in connection with another felony.
There are also provisions that may apply to the felon in possession
due to his previous felonious conduct. The first and most noticeable
effect is on the defendant’s criminal history category, which will
necessarily be higher than a criminal history category of I (one). The
defendant may also be given an upward departure on the basis of any
126
previous conduct of which he was acquitted.
III. FEDERALIZATION OF STREET CRIME
In 2001, the federal government began a program known as
“Project Safe Neighborhood” to enforce “the strict provisions of federal
law, including no right to bail, long sentences with minimal good-time,
127
and incarceration in the federal prison system.” The idea of
“federalizing” traditionally state jurisdiction crimes is neither new nor
128
unique to the felon in possession law. The source of federal
government authority in local crimes is based on the expansive, post129
New Deal interpretation of the Commerce Clause. In the case of the
felon in possession law, there is a Constitutional requirement that the
130
weapon travelled from one state to another, a de minimis standard.
One consequence of the increased prosecution of traditionally state
crimes is that the federal prison population has increased at a faster rate
level determined from the application of subsections (b)(1) through (b)(4) may not exceed
level 29, except if subsection (b)(3)(A) applies.”).
123
See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(b)(5)-(7) (2009). See also
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(c) (2009).
124
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(b)(5) (2009).
125
Id. § 2K2.1(b)(6) (2009).
126
Id. § 4A1.3(a)(2)(E) (2009). See also United States v. Hardy, 99 F.3d 1242, 1250-51
(1st Cir. 1996) (“U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(e) . . . plainly encompasses charged conduct underlying
vacated convictions.”); United States v. Guthrie, 931 F.2d 564, 573 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The
district courts are . . . free . . . to decide whether the conduct underlying the vacated
conviction warrants an upward departure pursuant to Section 4A1.3 because it provides
‘reliable information’ regarding the defendant’s criminal past.”).
127
MCGARRELL ET AL., supra note 6, at 178.
128
Robert Heller, Comment, Selective Prosecution and the Federalization of Criminal
Law: The Need for Meaningful Review of Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 U. PA. L. REV.
1309, 1311 (1997).
129
Id.
130
See discussion supra Section I.
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131

than the state prison population. In the past fifteen years, the federal
132
Specifically pertaining to felons in
prison population has doubled.
possession, the number of unlawful weapons defendants appearing in
133
court almost doubled from 2000 to 2005. Not only is the number of
defendants increasing, but the mean length of imposed sentences is also
134
trending upwards.
One potent example of the interaction among the felon in
possession law, sentencing under the guidelines, and increasing
135
federalization of state crime can be seen in Colorado’s “Project Exile.”
This was a pilot program for the national “Project Safe Neighborhood,”
but specifically mandated the zealous federal prosecution of weapons
136
offenses. The program provided for three new Assistant United States
137
Attorneys who would exclusively handle Project Exile cases. This
campaign resulted in the prosecution of 191 people in Colorado, but 154
138
of those 191 people had committed no previous violent felony. Of the
remaining people, only seventeen had even possessed a firearm in their
139
previous crimes and only four actually discharged the weapon. James
Allison, speaking for Colorado’s United States Attorney’s Office, takes
the position that the felon in possession law is not only concerned with
violence, but also is concerned with limiting access to firearms for those
140
who have evinced bad judgment by way of past felonious conduct.
This bad judgment, the office argues, makes these people relatively
141
more dangerous to society. Mr. Allison purports that this view echoes
142
Congress’ concerns in enacting the felon in possession statute. This
131

Prison Count 2010: State Population Declines for the First Time in 38 Years, PEW
CTR. OF THE STATES, 1 (2010), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org
/report_detail.aspx?id=57653.
132
Id.
133
See infra Appendix I “Number of defendants in cases filed.”
134
See infra Appendix II “Mean prison sentence in months.”
135
David Holthouse, Living in Exile: Federal Prisons Are Filling up with People Whose
Only Crime Is the Possession of a Gun., WESTWORD (Mar. 21, 2002), available at
http://www.westword.com/content/printVersion/218375.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Holthouse, supra note 135.
142
Id. (“‘And from my (James Allison’s) observation, people who have felony
convictions, whether they’re forgery, writing bad checks, stealing or doing anything else
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view, however, ignores any predetermination of the relative
dangerousness of the individual based on their previous sentence.
The fact that felon in possession charges can be predicated upon
past state level convictions adds a level of complexity to the analysis of
the “dangerousness” of the felon in possession. The law states that any
person convicted of a felony punishable by up to a year imprisonment,
or a misdemeanor punishable by up to two years imprisonment, cannot
143
possess a firearm. This requirement may be overbroad in that it will
“indiscriminately sweep up state convictions regardless of their
144
manifestations of dangerousness.” Additionally, notice may be
wanting because the law states that, to serve as a predicate, the felony
145
may have been punishable by up to a year in prison. The law may
leave individuals who obtained more lenient sentencing, especially
those who were not sentenced to any term of imprisonment, unaware
146
that they are subject to the law.
Allowing federal convictions based on prior state convictions is
also a problem because it ignores the lenity granted by the state court
judge when determining whether or not someone is a felon for purposes
147
of the statute. One can reasonably infer that, in certain cases where the
state court judge is lenient, the judge may have believed that the
individual was not particularly dangerous to society. However, the state
court’s prior determination of the relative dangerousness of the
individual is disregarded for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
IV. CRIMINAL FORUM SHOPPING
Due to the concurrent jurisdiction between the state and the federal
government for these types of weapons violations, when a firearm
that’s nonviolent, they have bad judgment. And I agree with Congress that if you’re going to
limit the possession of firearms, let’s start with people who’ve been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt to have exercised very poor judgment.’”).
143
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2005). See also Wayne A. Logan, Creating a “Hydra in
Government”: Federal Recourse to State Law in Crime Fighting, 86 B.U. L. REV. 65, 80-82
(2006).
144
Logan, supra note 143, at 80.
145
Id.
146
Id. For a brief analysis of the Second Amendment concerns this situation presents,
see Douglas A. Berman, SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY BLOG (Aug. 5, 2010),
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2010/08/seventh-circuit-rejectsasapplied-second-amendment-challenge-to-922g1-but-suggests-a-nonviolent-felo.html.
147
Logan, supra note 143, at 81-82.
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possessed by a former felon has traveled interstate, local law
148
enforcement is able to refer the case for federal prosecution. However,
local prosecutors, because of the duplicitous nature of the federal
149
criminal code, would have pursued many of these cases anyway.
Additionally, in at least one jurisdiction in the Eastern District of
Michigan, under Project Safe Neighborhood, the U.S. Attorney’s Office
will consult with local law enforcement and if the defendant meets a
certain criteria the local prosecutor’s office will offer the defendant a
plea bargain at the state level with the consequence of federal
150
prosecution for refusal. This threat of federal prosecution allows the
U.S. Attorney’s Office to secure harsher plea bargains at the state level,
thus accomplishing Congress’s goals in securing harsher penalties under
151
Section 922(g) without having to expend substantial federal resources.
While Congress purposely wrote the statute to be over-inclusive, with
the understanding that U.S. Attorney’s Office would exercise
prosecutorial discretion, it seems unlikely that Congress contemplated
152
this use. Allowing law enforcement officers to determine whether to
refer a case for federal prosecution reduces political accountability at
the state level by allowing the state legislature to not incur the political
153
cost of maintaining its own felon in possession statute.
V. ANALYSIS
Certain legal scholars have been critical of the federalization of
street crime with respect to disparate sentencing at the state and federal
154
levels. In a state court, the defendant may receive a sentence that is
148

See Edward R. McGuire & William R. King, Trends in the Policing Industry, 593
ANNALS 15, 28 (2004).
149
Daniel Richman, The Changing Boundaries Between Federal and Local Law
Enforcement, 2 BOUNDARY CHANGES CRIM. JUST. ORG. 81, 98 (Charles M. Friel, ed., 2000),
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/criminal_justice2000/vol_2/02d2.pdf.
150
Melodee Henderson, Case Digest Issue: Constitutional Law - Due Process - Federal
Prosecution Following a Defendant’s Rejection of a State Plea Offer Does Not Violate Due
Process or Constitute Vindictive Prosecution, 84 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 2 (2006).
151
Id. See also United States v. Gray, 382 F. Supp. 2d 898, 907 (E.D. Mich. 2005)
(holding that this type of practice does not constitute “vindictive prosecution” and denying
dismissal of the indictment).
152
See generally James E. Hooper, Note, Bright Lines, Dark Deeds: Counting
Convictions Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1951 (1991).
153
Richman, supra note 149, at 97.
154
Id.
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relatively mild when compared to a federal sentence for the same
155
conduct. The federal government’s reliance on prior state offenses to
establish criminal liability for a crime over which the state has
156
concurrent jurisdiction is particularly disconcerting. By imposing
harsher sentences, the federal government substitutes its own judgment
157
in penalizing local criminal conduct for the judgment of the state.
Aberrational state-federal sentencing disparities based on the
158
federalization of street-crime decreases political accountability. By
deciding to refer a case for federal prosecution, state law enforcement is
essentially circumventing the law of the state in which the arrest
159
occurred. If the people of that state would have adopted the federal
law with the accompanying guideline range, then the state legislature is
160
able to escape the political costs of their enactments. However, if the
people of the state would not have adopted the legislation, then state law
161
enforcement is essentially nullifying the preferences of the electorate.
In either scenario, securing harsher penalties under federal law obscures
162
state-level accountability. Furthermore, virtually every circuit has held
that the district court need not consider the hypothetical state sentence
163
for the crime, and that has exacerbated this obfuscation.
However, the courts do differ in the extent to which they exclude
consideration of sentences for similarly situated state defendants. Even
post-Booker, some circuits take a “hard” approach by declaring
irrelevant the potential state sentence a federal defendant would have
164
faced. Other circuits take a “soft” approach by declaring that it is not
155

Id.
Id. at 104.
157
Logan, supra note 143, at 95-96.
158
Richman, supra note 149, at 97.
159
Id. at 97, 102.
160
Id. at 97.
161
Id.
162
See generally id.
163
See, e.g., United States v. Ringgold, 571 F.3d 948, 950-53 (9th Cir. 2009) (“We
agree with those circuits to have reached the issue that a district court judge does not abuse
his discretion in declining to consider under § 3553(a)(6) the sentence a defendant would
have received for the same conduct in state court.”).
164
See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 434 F.3d 684, 686 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding
improper a district court sentence that, in light of the fact that the case was first brought in
state court before being prosecuted federally, considered the corresponding state sentence);
United States v. Malone, 503 F.3d 481, 486 (6th Cir. 2007) (“holding that it is
impermissible for a district court to consider the defendant’s likely state court sentence as a
156
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error for a district court to refuse to consider the potential state sentence
165
a federal defendant would have faced. The reason for the circuit
courts’ universal refusal to consider the state-federal sentencing
disparity, as mentioned above, is that Congress directed the Guidelines
166
be created to provide federal sentencing uniformity. This is among the
167
Guidelines’ purported goals.
However, the technical and practical applications of the felon in
possession law undermine this concern for federal sentencing
uniformity. The felon in possession law is already closely tied to state
substantive law and state law enforcement. As mentioned previously,
felon in possession cases are often predicated on state offenses. They
also often originate at the state level either with state law enforcement
or, in some instances, in state court. These two aspects of the felon in
possession law, along with their respective problems as referenced
throughout this paper, destroy any chance of uniformity in the federal
system in the first instance, and then carry those disparities forward to
sentencing. For this reason, it seems naïve to urge uniformity in federal
sentencing when the underlying convictions will, by statutory
definition, be dependent upon disparate state law.
A preferable sentencing method would be to allow, if not require in
some cases, the district courts to consider the state-federal sentencing
disparity. The increase of felon in possession convictions due to the
increased efforts of federal prosecutors through programs such as
Project Safe Neighborhood, a program that demonstrably aimed its pilot
factor in determining his federal sentence”); United States v. Schmitt, 495 F.3d 860, 863
(7th Cir. 2007) (explaining that it is impermissible to consider federal-state sentencing
disparities when it would increase sentencing disparities among federal defendants); United
States v. Jeremiah, 446 F.3d 805, 808 (8th Cir. 2006) (“The District Court was neither
required nor permitted under § 3553(a)(6) to consider a potential federal/state sentencing
disparity in imposing Jeremiah’s sentence.”).
165
See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 505 F.3d 120, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2007) (upholding
the district court’s refusal to consider the federal-state sentencing disparity where a felon in
possession defendant faced 120 months in federal court, but would only have faced up to
seven years (eighty-four months) in state court); United States v. Branson, 463 F.3d 1110,
1112 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing “hard approach” cases but limiting decision to declaring
reasonable a refusal to consider federal-state sentencing disparities); United States v.
Dowdy, 216 Fed. App’x. 178, 182 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding it is not error to decline to
consider disparate sentences between coconspirators when one is prosecuted in state court
and the other in federal court).
166
Dowdy, 216 Fed. App’x. at 182.
167
Id. See also discussion supra Section II.A.

MCDONALD FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011

FELON IN POSSESSION SENTENCING

12/16/2011 12:31 PM

127

at people without any history of violence, creates fairness concerns.
This is especially true when the federal government uses threat of
federal indictment to affect harsher state-level plea bargains. Allowing
the courts to consider the federal-state sentencing disparity would help
to allay some of these problems and reign in an overly harsh system.
Additionally, allowing federal courts to consider state sentences
could ease the tension between uniformity and proportionality in the
Guidelines. If predicating criminal liability on state crimes lessens
federal uniformity in the first instance, removing the concern altogether
should provide for more proportionate sentences and thus achieve
another of the Guidelines’ goals. Tracking federal sentences to state
sentences in this context could allow for greater recognition of the
relative dangerousness of the defendant in that particular community
because the state is less removed from the citizenry of that state than is
the federal government. This would also force politicians to make real
decisions on felon in possession penalties if they agree with the federal
government that the penalties should be harsh. In other words, it would
eliminate the negative effect on political accountability at the state level.
VI. CONCLUSION
In an era when prison overcrowding is a growing concern due to
real economic limitations, it may be an unwise policy to use federal
resources in pursuing essentially local crime. Tracking federal sentences
for felon in possession offenses could help to stem the growth of the
federal prison system. By removing one of the prosecutorial benefits of
federal court, i.e., harsher sentences, federal prosecutors would likely
pursue only the more serious offenses; the cost of prosecuting the lesser
offenses may now outweigh the relative benefits. If state prosecutors do
bring charges on the felon in possession offenses previously handled by
the federal government, the impact on the prison system should be
relatively less because there are significantly more state prisons on the
aggregate than there are federal prisons. The relative increase in the
prison population of the state should be less than the relative increase in
the prison population of the federal government. This would focus
prison and prosecutorial resources on the most dangers offenders by
taking away incentives to incarcerate people who may simply have
evinced bad judgment in the past, but who are nonetheless not
dangerous to others around them.
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Fedeeral Criminal Case Processiing Statistics, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
U
STATISTTICS,
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/fj
fjsrc/ (under “U
U.S. Criminal Code: Choose a Statistic” seelect
i cases filed”; then
t
select year and choose “Seelect by chapter and
“Numberr of defendants in
section within
w
U.S.C. Title
T
18”; selectt chapter “44-Fiirearms”; then select “18 922 G”;
finally, seelect desired outtput format) (lasst visited Oct. 233, 2010), data iss on file with auuthor
in Microssoft Excel formaat.
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VIII. APPENDIX II169

Mean prison sentence in
months
68
66
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2000

169

2001
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2003
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2005

2006

2007

2008

See Federal Criminal Case Processing Statistics, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/fjsrc/ (under “U.S. Criminal Code: Choose a Statistic” select “Mean
prison or probation sentence, or fine amount, for defendants convicted”; then select year and
choose “Select by chapter and section within U.S.C. Title 18”; select chapter “44-Firearms”;
then select “18 922 G”; finally, select desired output format) (last visited Oct. 23, 2010),
data is on file with author in Microsoft Excel format.
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See Federal Criminal Case Processing Statistics, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/fjsrc/ (under “U.S. Criminal Code: Choose a Statistic”
select “Mean prison or probation sentence, or fine amount, for defendants
convicted”; then select year and choose “Select by chapter and section within
U.S.C. Title 18”; select chapter “44-Firearms”; then select “18 922 G”; finally,
select desired output format) (last visited Oct. 23, 2010), data is on file with author
in Microsoft Excel format.

